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S
ocial Security is in trouble. A recent report by the U.S. General Account-
ing Ofﬁce (1997) indicates that absent any changes to the current system,
payments to beneﬁciaries will exceed revenues from payroll taxes in
2012, and by 2029 the Social Security Trust Fund will be depleted. That Social
Security is in trouble is not really news. The system has a long history of being
underﬁnanced, and the current difﬁculties are not historically large. Recently,
the 1994–1996 Advisory Council on Social Security issued its report with var-
ious recommendations for putting the system on ﬁrm ﬁnancial footing. From
an economic perspective, making the Social Security System sound is not a
difﬁcult task. There exist a multitude of ways for doing so, but most involve
either increases in taxes, reductions in beneﬁts, or both. Thus, any plan inher-
ently involves difﬁcult political decisions. However, one part of the solution
that is included in each of the three separate plans that were presented to the
Commissioner of Social Security was the recommendation that some portion
of the current trust fund be invested in the stock market. By taking advantage
of the higher returns earned by equities, this recommendation seemingly would
reduce the increases in taxes or the reduction in beneﬁts that would be needed
to return the Social Security System to ﬁnancial viability.
In this article I address the economic merits of this recommendation. My
analysis suggests that the ownership of the capital stock has very few conse-
quences for the government’s budget. The economic opportunities available to
society are not increased by a transfer of capital from the private sector to the
government. In short, there is no free lunch.
I wish to thank Douglas Diamond, Andreas Hornstein, Thomas Humphrey, Kent Smetters,
and Alex Wolman for many useful suggestions and comments. The views expressed herein
are the author’s and do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or
the Federal Reserve System.
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1. A BRIEF HISTORY
The Inception of Social Security
Social Security was created in 1935 as an intergenerational transfer program
from workers to retirees. Its design also provided for income redistribution
among the elderly, because replacement rates (the ratio of the beneﬁt paid in
the ﬁrst year of retirement to taxable earnings in the preceding year) are higher
for low-income workers than for high-income workers. Social Security is a
pay-as-you-go system. In years when the revenue from Social Security taxes
exceeds outlays, the U.S. Treasury uses the proceeds to ﬁnance other expen-
ditures, thereby reducing the level of government debt from what it otherwise
would have been. There exists the accounting ﬁction of a trust fund, but from
an economic perspective no such fund exists. The lower level of government
debt makes it more likely that future claims will be honored, but there is no
dedicated set of securities belonging to the Social Security Administration that
has the same legal standing as a government bond issued to a private citizen.
Because it is a pay-as-you-go system, there is the potential that, for a variety
of reasons, promised payments could become increasingly difﬁcult to honor.
This is what has happened repeatedly to the Social Security System.
Despite its problems, the Social Security System has been remarkably suc-
cessful in terms of its growth and its economic importance. At the time of its
creation, the old age and survivors insurance (OASI) part of the program was
fairly small, with beneﬁts equaling 0.03 percent of GDP in 1940. By 1950 that
percentage had risen to only 0.33 percent of GDP, but by 1996 it had risen to
over 4 percent of GDP. In terms of taxable payrolls, beneﬁts were 10.7 percent
in 1994, which is very close to the 10 percent envisioned in the 1939 Act
(see Miron and Weil [1997]) and represented roughly 19 percent of all federal
outlays. Over time, the fraction of the labor force covered by Social Security
has risen from 63.7 percent in 1940 to 97.6 percent in 1993.
Social Security has also played a major role in reducing the percent of
those over 65 who live below the poverty line. In 1959, 35.2 percent of the
elderly were characterized as poor. By 1994, that ﬁgure had dropped to 11.7
percent. The increase in Social Security beneﬁts is in large part responsible for
this decline. Expressed in terms of 1995 dollars, the average monthly beneﬁt in
1950 was $269.30, in 1960 it was $381.38, and in 1995 it was $719.80. Also,
the number of beneﬁciaries has risen substantially from 222,488 in 1940 to
37.5 million in 1995. In terms of percentages of the population over 65, only
7 percent received beneﬁts in 1940, whereas 91.3 percent received beneﬁts in
1995. More importantly from the standpoint of helping the poor, Social Secu-
rity currently provides over 90 percent of income for half the seniors below
the poverty line and 50 percent of income for two-thirds of all beneﬁciaries.
As the preceding ﬁgures show, the scope and amount of coverage has
increased greatly since the inception of Social Security. The original act   
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promised beneﬁts only to those who contributed, but in 1939 beneﬁts were
extended to spouses and surviving widows. Over time, various changes have
expanded the scope of Social Security, with perhaps the most important ex-
tension resulting from the 1950 Act that brought 10 million new workers into
the system. Also, various changes in computing beneﬁts, coupled with high
inﬂation and growth in wages, served to increase beneﬁts, which consequently
grew much faster than the economy.
Initially a 2 percent tax rate, equally divided between employer and em-
ployee, was levied on income up to $3,000. The ﬁrst beneﬁts to contributing
retirees were not to be paid until 1942, but the 1939 Act moved that date
forward to 1940. Further, no beneﬁts were to be paid in any month that a
retiree earned more than $15. To put that ﬁgure in perspective, the average
annual wage in 1937 was $979. This feature of the system indicates that Social
Security was in part envisioned as insurance against destitution. However, under
the assumption of no inﬂation and no wage growth, the replacement rate for
a worker earning $1,000 for 45 years, and retiring at age 65 in 2002, would
have been 0.60 under the initial act. That means that this hypothetical worker
would have received $600 a year in perpetuity, implying that the initial act also
possessed features that went far beyond mere insurance. A 60-year-old worker
earning the same salary ($1,000) and retiring in 1942 would have received
beneﬁts of $200 a year. With the extension of beneﬁt eligibility, the 1939 Act
also reduced the replacement rate to 0.43. Thus, our hypothetical worker would
receive only $430 upon retirement, while his spouse would receive $215.
Under the 1939 Act, the combined tax rates on employer and employee
were 2 percent and were scheduled to rise to 6 percent by 1949 and remain
ﬁxed thereafter. Full beneﬁts would not begin until 1991, when workers with a
full history of contributions would be retiring. According to projections at the
time, the internal real rate of return for those retirees would be 3.9 percent, not
much above the 3 percent rate of return that was projected on the accumulated
trust fund. Or, in more relevant terms, the internal rate of return would not
be too far above the economy’s growth rate and beneﬁts could be paid by
issuing government debt without increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus the
initial planning attempted to create a sustainable system.
A History of Problems
Over its history the Social Security System probably has never been sound.
The chief reason is that Congress tended to make beneﬁts more generous than
originally intended and refused to raise tax rates as fast as the 1939 Act pre-
scribed. Tax rates did not reach 6 percent until 1960. Also, economic factors
such as usage growth interacted with the methodology for calculating beneﬁts,
increased the level of beneﬁts in unintended ways during the 1970s, and placed
the system under tremendous strain. Corrections to the methodology were not  
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made quickly enough, and tax rates were not raised sufﬁciently, so that the sys-
tem almost defaulted in the early 1980s. Demographic changes also conspired
to make the system less sound than it would have been under stable population
growth. Thus, under current law someone just entering the labor force will earn
a rate of return on Social Security contributions that is probably negative, while
the rate of return for those that have already retired is signiﬁcantly higher than
was intended.
The 1950 Act, which brought in 10 million new workers, also calculated
their beneﬁts in a way that provided them with large transfers. Expansion in
scope need not have been detrimental to the soundness of the system, but
these workers received beneﬁts that were based on their wage history after
1950 rather than on their entire wage history. Thus, individuals from this group
who retired soon after 1950 received full beneﬁts and a large transfer from
the existing system. Basically for this group the link between the replacement
rate and the number of years of paying into the system was cut, and these
new retirees received the same beneﬁts as those who had been in the system
since its inception. To accommodate this change, average beneﬁts were slightly
reduced.
Perhaps the most severe problem for the system was created by the 1972
Act, which for the ﬁrst time included automatic price adjustments. Previously,
such adjustments were made on an ad hoc basis. However, the adjustment
procedure ended up overcompensating workers and made replacement rates
unstable (for an excellent discussion see Munnell [1977]). The cost-of-living
adjustment for retirees did not present a problem. Rather, the calculated re-
placement rates for newly retired workers were overstated. In essence these
workers received an increase in their beneﬁts that accounted not only for in-
ﬂation but for wage growth as well. Because wages tend to rise with inﬂation,
new retirees received a double counting. The amount of initial beneﬁts also
increased with the disparity between real wage growth and inﬂation. In this
manner, the economic climate at the time, along with the unsound method of
computing initial beneﬁts, placed great stress on the system, with replacement
rates rising from 47.9 percent in 1970 to 66.7 percent in 1980. As a result,
the individual that retired in the 1970s received the largest net transfer of any
cohort under Social Security.
The mistakes in the 1972 Act led to the rescue package of 1977, which con-
stituted the largest peace-time tax increase in U.S. history. The rescue package
also stopped initial beneﬁts from rising faster than wage growth. The sys-
tem was pronounced sound for the rest of the century and well into the next
one. Unfortunately, the pronouncement was wrong. By 1981, there was a high
probability that the system would not be able to meet its promised beneﬁts.
A commission was appointed to deal with the problem. Its lack of complete
success is in part why Social Security restructuring is currently receiving so
much attention. The 1983 Act did raise the schedule of tax rates and the annual       
M. Dotsey: Investing in Equities: Can it Help Social Security? 53
maximum on taxable earnings. It also effectively reduced beneﬁts by taxing
some portion of Social Security payments. Finally, it gradually raised the age
to 67 at which full beneﬁts were paid for the cohort born in 1960. Combined,
these changes averted a problem of failing to honor legislated beneﬁts but failed
to solve the problem of long-term insolvency.
The Current Problem
The Social Security System as currently constituted is not actuarially sound.
In this regard, the important date is 2012, because that is when expenditures
will exceed receipts. At that point the federal government will have to raise
taxes, reduce government spending, or increase its borrowing in order to make
the promised payments to retirees. Beyond that date, the revenue shortfall will
increase and the necessary adjustments will be more dramatic. It is estimated
that the revenue shortfall will be $57 billion in 2015 and grow to $232 billion
in 2020. Put in perspective, current total OASI payments are approximately
$308 billion dollars. This deﬁcit will occur in part because there will be an
estimated 50.4 million beneﬁciaries in 2015, up from 37.5 million in 1995.
As mentioned earlier, the system’s current troubles are a consequence of
increasing beneﬁts, due both to the increased number of retirees and the more
generous beneﬁts that each retiree receives. One way to gauge the increase in
the level of beneﬁts is to compare them with average wages. For example, in
1953 the maximum beneﬁt was equivalent to 30.5 percent of the average wage.
By 1981 the corresponding ﬁgure was greater than 50 percent, and in 1995 it
equaled 60.5 percent (Marcks 1997). Unquestionably, retirees’ beneﬁts have
been rising relative to the tax base that can support those beneﬁts.
The problem is also one of demographics. In 1945 there were 42 workers
per retiree. In 1995 that number had shrunk to 3.3, and it is projected that in
2030 there will only be 2 workers per retiree. Furthermore, the life expectancy
of individuals has increased since the inception of the system, meaning that
a greater fraction of contributors have become beneﬁciaries. Also, the length
of retirement has increased. In 1940 a 65-year-old male and female had a life
expectancy of 12 and 13 years, respectively. By 2015 the comparable numbers
will be 16 and 20 years.
These demographic features imply that maintaining the current level of
beneﬁts requires a signiﬁcant increase in taxes. The Report of the 1994–1996
Advisory Council on Social Security (Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices 1997) indicates that taxes would have to be raised immediately by 2.13
percent to attain 75-year balance.1 These calculations explicitly take into ac-
1 It should be noted that 75-year balance and actuarial soundness are not the same thing,
because the problems of the system tend to worsen in the future. Thus 75-year soundness today
implies 75-year unsoundness tomorrow.      
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count interest payments and payments on principal from the ﬁctitious trust
fund. To make these payments, the government would have to increase the
level of the debt, reduce spending, or increase tax revenue from other sources.2
Thus, total tax payments could be substantially higher if all forms of taxes are
considered. Waiting to adjust tax rates will only make the problem worse.
2. THE STOCK MARKET TO THE RESCUE?
Over the period 1926 to 1993, the real return on the Standard & Poor’s 500
averaged 9 percent, while the real yield on intermediate-term U.S. government
bonds averaged only 2.2 percent. This difference in yields is large. For ex-
ample, earning 9 percent implies that your investment doubles approximately
every eight years as compared to every 35 years with a 2.2 percent return.
Furthermore, in every 22-year period since 1926, equities have outperformed
bonds. These considerations have spurred many observers to argue that invest-
ing at least some portion of the Social Security Trust Fund in equities can avert
the ﬁnancial difﬁculties facing the system.
In one sense the proposition is true. Increasing the yield on the trust fund
can make the Social Security System more viable in isolation. However, it
can only do so by making the rest of the government worse off. On net, an
individual taxpayer will be little affected by this investment policy. In order for
the government, or some part of it, to take an equity position, the government
as a whole must issue more bonds. This swap of paper claims with the public
affects the allocations and the risk characteristics of the respective portfolios
but quantitatively does not have any appreciable effect on the government’s
overall budget. The economy cannot produce any more goods, and although
the consumption proﬁle of the representative household may be somewhat al-
tered, the effects of this alteration are small. Since taxpayers are the ultimate
receivers of any government earnings or losses, it matters little who owns the
capital stock.
A number of economists recognize this fairly simple notion. Federal Re-
serve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed the idea cogently in his recent
Remarks at the Abraham Lincoln Award Ceremony of the Union League of
Philadelphia (1996, p. 8), “Bonds and equities are merely the paper claims to
income earning assets, and the value of the income stream is not determined by
short-run changes in the supply and demand for securities. Rather, equity prices
2 If the payments promised by Social Security are equivalent to payments promised on
government bonds, then increasing the level of the measured debt to pay off these claims does
not affect the overall indebtedness of the U.S. government. This action just transfers a promise
into an explicit security. Treating the promised Social Security beneﬁts in a similar way to any
other government IOU implies that the true level of the government debt is closer to $17 trillion
instead of the $5 trillion currently calculated.    
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must, in the long run, reﬂect the underlying earnings of the corporations on
which the equities are a claim, as well as society’s need to be compensated for
postponing consumption into the future and its perception and attitudes toward
risk as a consequence of uncertainty about the future. Indeed, the total market
value of debt plus equities is, to a ﬁrst approximation, likely to be unaffected
by a shift in the balance of paper claims.” These sentiments are also reﬂected in
the views of Herbert Stein (1997, p. A18), “. . . privatizing the Social Security
funds would not add to national saving, private investment, or the national
income and would not allow the system to earn more income without anyone
earning less.”
Others, however, have argued to the contrary and have made the purchase
of equities by the trust fund seem like a free lunch. For example, editorial
commentary in Barron’s Online by Thomas G. Donlan (1997) states that “Un-
less the system invests in private enterprise and those investments continue
to earn historically high returns the Baby Boom generation will pay for its
own retirement.” Investing in equities is a major component of all three plans
presented by the 1994–1996 Advisory Council on Social Security (Department
of Health and Human Services 1997).
The Trust Fund
The Social Security System is but one part of the government. It is the largest
part, with transfers amounting to 22 percent of government expenditures in
1995. The system’s trust fund is really a myth. Social Security receives con-
tributions or taxes from workers and their employers and pays out beneﬁts
to retirees, their dependents, and those on disability. Excesses in receipts over
expenditures are handed over to the U.S. Treasury to be used in ﬁnancing other
governmental activities. Employing an accounting ﬁction, the Social Security
System treats these transfers as investment in government securities and adds
them to an imaginary portfolio that also collects ﬁctitious interest payments.
From the perspective of the government’s total budget, this practice implies
that the Treasury issues fewer bonds to the public than it would if there were
no surplus received from Social Security. Unlike Treasury bills issued to the
public, however, the IOUs from the Treasury to Social Security are not counted
as government debt.
What would happen if the Social Security System invested in equities? The
system would currently turn over less surplus to the Treasury, and the Treasury
would have to issue more bonds to the public. Again, from the perspective of
the government as a whole, this transaction amounts to a trade of bonds for
equities with the public. Can such a trade beneﬁt the public? Since equities
are a claim on ﬁrms, government ownership of stock amounts to government
ownership of some portion of the country’s capital stock. So the preceding
question can be rephrased. Does it matter who owns the capital stock? The
analysis presented below attempts to shed light on that question. It turns out       
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that the policy of government investment in equities has either only minor or
no effects on the government’s budget and the saving rate of the economy.
Whether the government’s ﬁnancing decisions have any economic effect de-
pends on its ability to transfer risk across individuals. In the models considered
in Section 3, that ability is absent, and hence government portfolio decisions
are irrelevant. The overlapping generations model of Section 4 allows some
scope for more efﬁcient risk-sharing and the government’s portfolio decision
does affect economic behavior. Quantitatively, this effect turns out to be small.
3. A MODEL WITH INFINITELY LIVED AGENTS
In this section I use a model populated by inﬁnitely lived agents (or more gen-
erally, the dynastic families possessing bequest motives as in Barro [1974]) to
explore whether government investment in private capital affects the amount of
tax revenue needed to support a given stream of transfer payments. Answering
this question is analogous to answering the question of whether investment by
the Social Security Administration in the stock market would have any impact
on the ﬁnancing of a given stream of Social Security payments. I analyze this
question in a sequence of models that highlight the key issue, namely that equity
premium considerations are unimportant and it is only the transferring of risk
across generations that has any effect on economic outcomes.3 The model with
inﬁnitely lived agents clearly makes the point that when there is no possibility
of transferring risk among agents, because all agents are essentially the same,
the existence of an equity premium does not in any way allow government
ownership of capital to inﬂuence economic outcomes.
To begin, I shall consider a world in which all transfers and taxes are lump
sum. Private agents own some portion of the capital stock and the government
owns the rest. The government may also issue debt. It ﬁnances transfer pay-
ments and the interest payments on debt through its earnings on capital and
through taxes. I will show that in such a world the behavior of individuals
is unaffected by the portion of the capital stock owned by the government.
Essentially, any distribution of ownership of the capital stock is consistent with
the initial path of transfers and taxes and has no effect on the consumption
or saving decisions of individuals. In other words, the government’s portfolio
decision is irrelevant. I shall then extend this model to include distortionary
taxes and show that the results are unchanged.
The Model with Lump Sum Taxes
This model economy is populated by people who live forever or, more gen-
erally, by the dynastic families in Barro (1974). Output is stochastic and is
3 For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Bohn (1997a, b).                   
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produced via a standard neoclassical production function using capital and
labor. The government ﬁnances lump sum transfers through lump sum taxes,
the issuance of debt, and the return from its ownership of capital.
Individual Decisions
To start the analysis, consider the problem of the individual agent who wishes
to maximize lifetime well-being or utility subject to a budget constraint. The
individual owns some capital that earns ½(st) in state s at time t. That is,
the return to capital is stochastic and, while one observes the actual return in
any given period, future returns are uncertain and depend on the state of the
economy in that period. Individuals also receive transfer payments from the
government Tr(st) and pay taxes T(st). These transfers and taxes may, but need
not, depend on the state of the economy. Individuals also own government
bonds, b(st), that pay r(st) units of consumption in all states in period t + 1.
Finally, given a capital stock at the beginning of period t, agents choose how
much capital to bring into the next period, k(st), and how much to consume
this period, c(st).






subject to per-period budget constraints in each possible state st.
c(st)+bd(st)+k(st) · w(st)n+½(st)k(st¡1)+[1+r(st¡1)]b(st¡1)+Tr(st)¡T(st),
where w is the real wage rate, n is exogenous labor supply, and ½ is the rate of
return on capital. For simplicity, I assume that capital fully depreciates each pe-
riod. Thus, agents are maximizing their utility, taking into account expectations
of all possible future events. In the notation above, st is the realization of one of
ﬁnitely many states of the economy at time t. st represents a particular history
of realizations up to time t. That is, st = (s0,s1, ...s t) is a particular history
of events up to time t. The set St represents all the possible histories that can
occur. Each event occurs with probability ¼(st) and each history occurs with
probability ¼(st). Each agent rents out labor and capital to ﬁrms in competitive
rental markets and earns the appropriate marginal product of each factor.









¼(st+1)u0[c(st+1)]½(st+1). (1b)               
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These conditions imply that agents accumulate assets so that they are just indif-
ferent between consuming an extra unit of consumption in any particular state
st or investing in either another bond or an extra unit of capital and consuming
the proceeds of that investment next period. Also, since a government bond
returns the same amount in each state at t + 1, it is less risky than holding
capital whose return is uncertain. The interest on a government bond will,
therefore, generally be less than the expected return on capital. That is, capital
will on average earn a premium over bonds with the amount of the premium
depending on the agent’s aversion to risk and the underlying riskiness of the
return on capital. It is this feature of bonds and capital that initially seems to
suggest that the government, by issuing bonds and owning some more capital,
can reduce the tax burden associated with any stream of transfer payments.
However, as the ﬁrst-order conditions make clear, both of these choices have
the same value when adjusted for risk, namely the current marginal utility of
consumption. Thus, there is no free lunch.
The Government
Each period the government makes some transfers, collects some taxes, and
adjusts its portfolio by either issuing or repurchasing some government bonds
or buying or selling some capital, x (or claims to the capital, which amount to
the same thing). In each state, the government’s net holding of assets obeys
bs(st) ¡ x(st) = b(st¡1)[1 + r(st¡1)] + Tr(st) ¡ T(st) ¡ ½(st)x(st¡1). (2)
It is clear from this expression that, all other things equal, an increase in the
capital stock held by the government at time t ¡ 1 reduces the taxes that are
necessary to maintain the same net asset position. The experiment we are in-
terested in, however, is not what happens if someone donates an extra unit of
capital to the government but what happens when the government increases its
holdings of capital by issuing additional debt.
Market Clearing
For any allocation of consumption, bonds, and capital to be an equilibrium,
it must be consistent with the resource constraints of the economy and with
supply equaling demand. In particular, for each state the following equations
hold:
c(st) + k(st) + x(st) = A(st)[k(st¡1) + x(st¡1)]®n1¡® (3)
and
bs(st) = bd(st). (4)
Equation (3) indicates that the amount consumed and invested must equal the
output produced in the current period, and equation (4) requires that the supply                    
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of bonds issued by the government must be equal to the demand for these
bonds by the public.
Solution
The consumption decision of agents will now be shown to be independent of
portfolio decisions of the government. Alternatively, agents do not care who
owns the capital stock since they are indifferent between holding an extra unit
of government debt or an extra unit of capital. In particular, consumption in
any state is given by
c(st) = (1 ¡ ¯)A(st)K(st¡1), (5)
where K is the aggregate capital stock equal to k + x. The accumulation of
private capital is then expressed as
k(st) = ¯A(st)K(st¡1) ¡ x(st¡1). (6)
As long as government capital does not exceed ¯A(st)K(st¡1), the above solu-
tions satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions of agents and do not violate the economy’s
overall resource constraint. Thus, for any supportable path of taxes and transfer
payments, individuals are indifferent as to who owns the capital stock.
The Model with Distortionary Taxes
Next consider the case where the government raises revenue through distor-
tionary taxation. In this setting it is not so easy to represent analytically the
solution to the decision problem of agents. However, by looking at the in-
dividual’s ﬁrst-order conditions and budget constraints along with the budget
constraint and transversality condition of the government, one sees that the
proportion of the capital stock owned by the government is irrelevant.
Individual Decisions
With distortionary taxes on both labor and interest income, the representative
agent maximizes lifetime utility subject to the following per-period budget
constraint,
c(st) + bd(st) + k(st) · ½(st)[1 ¡ ¿(st)]k(st¡1) + w(st)n[1 ¡ ¿(st)] (7)
f1 + r(st¡1)[1 ¡ ¿(st)]gb(st¡1) + Tr(st).
Unlike the previous budget constraint, the government now taxes wages and the
return on capital and bonds at the rate ¿. The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions
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where p(s
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t )]/u0[c(st)]g is the price of a contingent
claim. In the above expression s
t+j
t indicates a particular history of states from
t to t + j and S
t+j
t is the set of all possible histories.
Government
The government’s budget constraint is given by
bs(st) ¡ x(st) = b(st¡1)f1 + r(st¡1)[1 ¡ ¿(st)]g + Tr(st)
¡½(st)¿(st)k(st¡1) ¡ ¿(st)w(st)n ¡ ½(st)x(st) (10)
and indicates that the government’s net liability position depends on its debt,
the net interest paid on that debt, its revenues from taxing income earned from
capital and labor, as well as the revenue it earns on its own capital stock.4
The budget constraint implies that in states where capital has a relatively high
rate of return, some debt is retired, while in states where capital’s return is
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Equilibrium
Formally, the deﬁnition of an equilibrium is given by
4 Using the above budget constraint and the ﬁrst-order conditions of the representative agent,
the government’s lifetime budget constraint as of period t can be expressed as
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t )].
Notice that only the sum of private and government-owned capital stock enters the right-hand
side of equation (11). Therefore, for any sequence of state-contingent prices, only the total capital
stock and not its distribution affects the tax policies that are necessary to support a given stream
of transfer payments.                     
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Equilibrium: Given the initial conditions b(st¡1),x(st¡1), and k(st¡1), an equi-
librium is a sequence of quantities and prices fb(s),k(s),x(s),K(s),c(s),w(s),
r(s),½(s),¿(s),Tr(s)g for all histories s 2 S1
t satisfying the individual’s ﬁrst-
order conditions (8a) and (8b), the individual’s budget constraint (7), the
government’s budget constraint (10), the economy’s resource constraint (3),
and the transversality conditions of both the individual and the government (9)
and (11).
Irrelevance Proposition:5 Suppose that fb(s),k(s),x(s),K(s),c(s),w(s),r(s),
½(s),¿(s),Tr(s)g is an equilibrium, then any f¯ b(s), ¯ k(s), ¯ x(s),K(s),c(s),w(s),
r(s),½(s),¿(s),Tr(s)g is an equilibrium if ¯ b(s), ¯ k(s), ¯ x(s) satisfy (a) k(s), ¯ x(s) ¸ 0
and ¯ k(s) + ¯ x(s) = K(s), and (b) ¯ b(s) is deﬁned recursively by (10).
Proof: The individual’s ﬁrst-order conditions and the economy’s resource con-
straint are satisﬁed because the real allocations are identical in the two equi-
libriums. The individual’s transversality condition is, therefore, also satisﬁed.
Equilibrium in the goods market and condition (b) imply that the household’s
budget constraint is also satisﬁed. Examining the lifetime budget constraint of
the government from date t onward, one derives that
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Because the ﬁrst two terms are the same for both equilibriums, the last term
must be the same for both equilibriums. Therefore, the transversality condition
must hold for the second equilibrium. Hence, different distributions of the
capital stock do not affect the aggregate capital stock, consumption, rates of
return, tax rates, wages, or transfer payments.
As demonstrated in these models, the ownership of the capital stock has no
effect on economic outcomes and is not an avenue that can be used to rescue
the Social Security System in an economy where agents are altruistically linked
to future generations and, hence, behave as if they were inﬁnitely lived.
4. A MODEL WITH FINITE LIVED AGENTS
The previous two cases demonstrate that a premium in the return to capital rel-
ative to bonds is not sufﬁcient for government portfolio decisions to have any
5 I would like to thank Andreas Hornstein for suggesting and helping me with this particular
form of the argument.                   
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real effect on consumer decisions. Changes in portfolio allocations do not affect
the lifetime opportunities of the average individual, so they do not have any real
consequence. In a model with ﬁnite lived agents, however, portfolio decisions
generally will affect the economic behavior of consumers—not because capital
earns a higher return than bonds but because a change in the portfolio of old
agents must affect their consumption decisions. In the last period of life it is
the only decision they have left to make. Thus, the government ownership of
capital means that the current old agents hold more bonds. This consideration
implies that their consumption stream has different risk characteristics than
if the government owned no capital. Because the government’s ownership of
capital can transfer risk between current and future generations, it can change
behavior.6 In the setting of inﬁnitely lived agents, there is no one to whom they
can transfer risk. But because we are now considering different generations,
there is the potential for risk transfer. How big an effect policies involving
portfolio composition may have is an open question. In this section, some
rough estimates are formed in a simple two-period overlapping generations
model. The results suggest that government ownership of capital may not be
the boon that its proponents suggest.
The Individual
In the ﬁrst period of life, a young individual works a ﬁxed number of hours, n.
With his earnings, he pays taxes, saves to ﬁnance consumption when old, and
purchases goods for current consumption. Saving takes the form of ownership
of the capital stock and government bonds. When the individual reaches old
age, he receives transfers from the government, rental on the capital stock that
then fully depreciates, and after-tax interest plus principal on his government
bonds. With this income he purchases consumption goods. In this model econ-
omy production is stochastic and transfer payments are ﬁxed. Formally, the
individual’s problem is




subject to the budget constraints
cy(st) + k(st) + b(st) · w(st)n[1 ¡ ¿(st)] + Ty (13a)
and
co(st+1) · ½(st+1)[1 ¡ ¿k(st+1)]k(st) + (13b)
f1 + r(st)[1 ¡ ¿k(st+1)]gb(st) + To,
6 This idea is discussed in Volume II of the Report of the 1994–1996 Advisory Council on
Social Security (Department of Health and Human Services 1997). The effects of government
ﬁnancing decisions on intergenerational risk-sharing are formally derived in Bohn (1997a, b),
Smetters (1997), and Mariger (1997). Smetters shows that the risk-sharing engendered by the
government’s purchase of equities is equivalent to options contracts between generations.                     
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where the last constraint must hold for each possible state st+1 drawn from the
set St+1. The superscripts y and o refer to young and old, respectively.
Here, as in the previous examples, s indexes the various possible states that
can occur. The above speciﬁcation assumes that agents know what state they
are currently in but are unsure about next period’s state. All they know is the
probability, ¼, of any particular state occurring. Speciﬁcally, at time t, agents
know how productive the economy is, the transfers that are given to both the
current old and current young, the current tax rates on labor income, ¿, and
interest income, ¿k, the current wage rates, and the promised rate of interest on
government bonds. They do not, however, know what these variables will be
in the future. Thus, they attempt to maximize not only the utility from current
consumption but expected utility from future consumption.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the problem are
u0[cy(st)] = ¸y(st), (14a)









f1 + r(st)[1 ¡ ¿k(st+1)]gu0[co(st+1)]¼(st+1), (14d)
where a prime indicates the ﬁrst derivative and ¸y(st) and ¸o(st+1) are the multi-
pliers associated with the constraints (13a) and (13b). The last two constraints
give the efﬁcient consumption-saving decisions of the current young. These
conditions state that at an optimum the marginal utility of forgoing one unit
of consumption today must be equal to expected marginal utility of additional
consumption tomorrow earned from the proceeds of investing in another unit
of either capital or bonds. Notice that the last two equations also imply that
the certain yield on a bond and the expected after-tax yield on capital must be
such that the agent is indifferent between holding a bond or capital. As before,
because the return on capital is uncertain, the premium that capital earns over
bonds depends on the agent’s degree of risk aversion.
Firms
Firms produce output by employing the labor of the young and renting capital
from the old and from the government. The production function is constant
returns to scale and is given by
Y(st) = A(st)K(st¡1)®n1¡®, (15)             
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where Y is aggregate per capita output, and K is the aggregate per capita capital
stock. The maximization of proﬁts implies that each factor receives its marginal
product, which will depend on the productivity shock A(st).
Government
The government issues bonds and purchases capital. It also supplies transfers
to the young, Ty, and the old, To. These latter transfers may be thought of as
Social Security although in reality the old receive more than just OASI pay-
ments alone. The government also raises revenue by taxing wage and capital
income as well as the interest earned on bonds. Speciﬁcally, the government’s
budget constraint is
B(st) ¡ x(st) = f1 + r(st¡1)[1 ¡ ¿k(st)]gB(st¡1) ¡ ½(st)x(st¡1) (16)
+ Ty + To ¡ ¿(st)w(st)n ¡ ¿k(st)½(st)k(st¡1),
where B(s) is the per capita aggregate supply of government bonds and x(s)i s
the per capita capital stock owned by the government. The government’s net
indebtedness B ¡ x is positively inﬂuenced by its repayment of existing debt,
the interest on that debt, and transfer payments. The government’s earnings on
its capital stock, as well as the revenue from the taxation of labor, bonds, and
the private sector’s return on capital, all reduce the government’s indebtedness.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this model is deﬁned as a sequence of quantities (consumption,
capital, and bond allocations), factor prices (wages, interest rates, and rental
rates), and taxes and transfers that are consistent with each agent’s maximization
of expected utility, and the ﬁrms’ maximization of proﬁts. Equilibrium satisﬁes
the individual’s budget constraints (13a) and (13b), the government’s budget
constraint (16), and the government’s transversality condition and results in the
clearing of both the bond and goods markets. In particular for each possible
history,
Y(st) = co(st) + cy(st) + K(st) (17a)
and
B(st) = b(st). (17b)
Also, the per capita capital stock must equal its individual components, i.e.,
K(s) = k(s) + x(s).
Unlike the case where agents are in effect inﬁnitely lived, a similar ir-
relevance proposition does not apply. In the overlapping generations model,
two separate budget constraints, one for the current old, (13b), and one for
the current young, (13a), must hold simultaneously. Notice that the sum of
these two budget constraints is the same as the budget constraint for the        
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inﬁnitely lived agent. Thus any allocation that satisﬁes the economy’s resource
constraints and the government’s budget constraint will satisfy the sum of the
two agents’ budget constraints; hence, total consumption will be unchanged.
However, this allocation will not generally satisfy each budget constraint sep-
arately, and individual consumption will vary with changes in the distribution
of capital. The variation in individual consumption implies that rates of return
will have to change as well and that the same sequence of tax rates cannot
support an identical path of transfer payments.
Analyzing the Effects of Government Ownership of Capital
To analyze the effects of government ownership of capital, I analyze the effect
on average tax rates of changes in the proportion of the capital stock owned
by the government. In doing so, the pattern of transfer payments and the gov-
ernment’s net asset position, B ¡ x, are ﬁxed. As a result the experiment does
not create any additional government indebtedness and maintains the level of
beneﬁts received by the elderly. The results of this experiment are suggestive
but not deﬁnitive. The model I use is admittedly stylized. Moreover, I do not
investigate plausible alternative ﬁscal policies, including those ﬁxing the net
present discounted value of government liabilities rather than ﬁxing them in
each and every period. The latter policy would produce a smoother stream of
taxes than the one analyzed here but would be computationally much harder
to implement. Also, because of the assumption that people live for two peri-
ods only, the beneﬁts of risk-sharing are likely to be overemphasized in this
framework. Old agents are required to hold all of the capital stock; thus any
ownership of capital by the government reduces their exposure to rate-of-return
risk. If the model included more periods, old agents could shift some of this
burden to agents in their middle ages and thus reduce the risk-sharing beneﬁts
that ensue from the government’s ownership of capital. The model also excludes
other forms of risk-sharing arrangements, such as capital-gains loss-offsets and
progressive taxation. Adding these features to the model would further reduce
the gains to intergenerational risk-sharing.7
The equations used to solve the model include one that speciﬁes the policy
of ﬁxing the government’s net indebtedness and an equation that speciﬁes the
taxation of labor income relative to interest income. Equations 13(a,b), 14(c,d),
15, 16, and the two ﬁrst-order conditions that determine the marginal product
of capital and labor are also employed. Together with a behavioral relationship
that speciﬁes the government’s purchase of capital, the solution to the model in-
volves solving 11 independent equations in 11 unknowns. The variables solved
for are the privately held capital stock, the publicly held capital stock, govern-
7 I wish to thank Douglas Diamond and Kent Smetters for bringing these points to my
attention.                 
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ment bond issue, consumption by the young, consumption by the old, output,
the interest rate paid on bonds, the rental rate on capital, wages, and the tax
rates on labor and interest income, respectively. This system can be reduced
to three equations that determine the interest rate, the aggregate capital stock,
and the tax rate. In deriving these equations, I assume that the government
maintains ownership of a ﬁxed percentage of the capital stock, ¹. It is also
assumed that utility displays constant relative risk aversion and takes the form
u(c) =
c1¡¾¡1
1¡¾ . Thus, the solution to this three-equation system yields the
policy function for K(st) = hk[K(st¡1),A(st),A(st¡1)], the functions ¿(st) =
h¿[K(st¡1),A(st),A(st¡1)], and r(st) = hr[K(st¡1),A(st),A(st¡1)].
To analyze the effects of government investment in capital, two slightly
different models are simulated, one in which only labor is taxed, ¿k = 0, and
one in which all income is taxed at the same rate, ¿ = ¿k. For given values
of transfers and net government indebtedness, I then compare tax rates and
the aggregate capital stock in model economies in which the government owns
0, 2.5, 5, and 10 percent of the capital stock. The proposal of investing up
to 40 percent of the Social Security Trust Fund in equities would result in a
much smaller proportion of government ownership of the capital stock than
any of the percentages considered. In 1995 the value of the Social Security
Trust Fund was approximately $458 billion, while the value of traded equity
was greater than $7.7 trillion. Thus, the experiments will, on this dimension,
overstate the effects of the current proposal. In essence, I am comparing the
equilibrium outcomes of four different economies. Transitional questions are,
therefore, not addressed by this experiment.
Calibration
In calibrating the model, I envision a period as corresponding to 25 years.
¯ is set at 0.5, which corresponds to an annual discount factor of roughly
0.973. Labor’s share of output, ®, is 2/3, and the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion, ¾, is set at 10, implying an average equity premium between 5.7 per-
cent and 7.1 percent. Transfers to the old generation are set to equal 4 percent
of steady-state output in the model. When only labor is taxed, such transfers are
equal to the actual percentage of output distributed by OASI. The government’s
indebtedness is 1 percent of output and transfers to the young are roughly 2.5
percent of output, implying a steady-state tax rate on labor of 10.67 percent.
This tax rate is close to the current tax rate of 10.52 percent on the OASI
portion of the Social Security tax. Thus, the labor-tax-only model is calibrated
to approximate the tax rate and the transfers that actually occur. Allowing the
government also to tax capital increases the tax base and results in a lower
steady-state tax rate and a somewhat higher level of capital and more output.
The fraction of output transferred to the old is, therefore, also somewhat lower
at 3.65 percent, although the old are receiving the same transfer in both models.      
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To analyze the effect on the average tax rate of government ownership
of capital, I simulate both model economies over four generations or periods
1,000 times and take averages of the tax rates and capital stock that are pro-
duced by the simulations. Each simulation is started at capital’s nonstochastic
steady state, which is invariant to the government’s portfolio allocation, and
each succeeding capital stock is solved for based on the preceding realized
value of capital and the past technology shocks. The tax rates and interest rate
that are consistent with this solution are also obtained. The stochastic process
for technology is identically and independently distributed with mean 1 and
standard deviation of 0.08. The standard deviation was chosen to match the
standard deviation of 25-year cumulative deviations from trend over the post–
World War II period. This ﬁgure would represent the standard deviation of any
generation’s income from trend income. The standard deviation of this cumu-
lative deviation from trend output was 0.13. I then used a standard deviation
that was as close to 0.13 as possible and that still allowed for well-behaved
policy functions of the capital stock.8 Because of the positive comovement of
inputs with the technology shock, 0.13 is an upper bound on the variation in
the technology shock. For example, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) obtain
estimates of the relative variability of the technology shock to output anywhere
from 48 to 90 percent. Therefore, 0.08 may not be an unreasonable number.
Results
The results of this experiment are reported in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 in-
cludes the results when only labor is taxed, and Table 2 contains the results
when both labor and interest income are taxed. For the case when only labor
is taxed, one sees that average tax rates fall from 0.1059 to 0.1041 as the
government increases its ownership of capital from zero to 10 percent of the
aggregate capital stock. At 2.5 percent ownership, the decline in the average tax
rate needed to support the level of transfer payments is negligible. It follows
that ownership of equities by the Social Security Trust Fund would have little
effect on the viability of the Social Security System. Because the decline in
tax rates is so small, the capital stock is only marginally higher under the
policy of government ownership of capital. In short, this proposed policy has
little economic effect. The case where all income is taxed at the same rate is
qualitatively similar. Basically, each economy’s performance is not inﬂuenced
by government portfolio decisions.
8 The models investigated above possess two steady states. One steady state, which is un-
stable, occurs at relatively low values of the capital stock. If the technology shock is too large,
the capital stock potentially can enter this unstable region and the policy functions diverge.     
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Table 1 Effects of Government Ownership of Capital
(only labor is taxed)
Fraction of capital owned 0 2.5 5 10
Average tax rate 0.1059 0.1054 0.1049 0.1041
Standard deviation of tax rate 0.0074 0.0082 0.0089 0.0105
Average capital stock 0.1059 0.1061 0.1063 0.1066
Standard deviation of capital stock 0.0139 0.0141 0.0143 0.0147
Table 2 Effects of Government Ownership of Capital
(all income is taxed)
Fraction of capital owned 0 2.5 5 10
Average tax rate 0.0610 0.0606 0.0603 0.0596
Standard deviation of the tax rate 0.0042 0.0048 0.0053 0.0064
Average capital stock 0.1420 0.1421 0.1422 0.1425
Standard deviation of the capital stock 0.0163 0.0165 0.0166 0.0169
5. CONCLUSIONS
Current proposals for modifying Social Security have one key feature in com-
mon: namely, investing part of the trust fund in equities. Advocates believe
that such a reallocation of the trust fund’s portfolio will make the system more
viable, and maintain the level of beneﬁts without resorting to large increases in
taxes. After analyzing the effects of such reallocation in some basic economic
models, the results are not encouraging. Even though capital on average earns
a higher rate of return than bonds, the government is not able to take much
advantage of this differential, because only the ability to shift risk matters. The
results in this regard are similar to those found in Bohn (1997a, b), Mariger
(1997), and Smetters (1997). Quantitatively, this risk shifting from old to young
does not signiﬁcantly affect the government’s budget or the economic behavior
of individuals. In short, under the ﬁscal policies studied above, there is not
much to be gained by government ownership of the capital stock. Actuarial
soundness of the Social Security System will have to be achieved through
other means.    
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